The controversy over the interpretation of Article (58) of the Jordanian Election Law of 2022 sparked a number of readings, some of which departed from the logic of the text and its legislative structure, not because of ambiguity in the wording, but rather as a result of confusion between political considerations and fundamental controls on legal interpretation. The problem in this debate does not lie in the difference in results, but in the approach that led to them.

The established rule in legislative interpretation requires that the text be read as an integrated unit, and that it be understood in light of its internal progression, and not that a paragraph be extracted from it and burdened with what is unbearable. Article (58) came with a clear sequential structure, starting with a general rule, then followed by specification and restricted exceptions, each of which has its reason and function. Any reading that ignores this progression inevitably leads to results that contradict the philosophy of the text.

One of the most prominent aspects of the methodological error is the confusion between the formative condition and the continuity condition. The representation of youth and women, as stipulated in the law, is a condition prior to the electoral process, which is taken into account when forming and accepting lists, and does not turn, by force of time, into a permanent restriction imposed when seats become vacant for any reason. Transferring this restriction from its natural time period to a later stage without an explicit text is considered an unsubstantiated expansion of interpretation.

This defect becomes more apparent when ignoring the significance of limitation in the fourth paragraph of Article (58/A). The legislator did not use the phrase “for any reason” in vain in some paragraphs, then unintentionally abandon it in others. When the fourth paragraph was limited to cases of resignation or party dismissal by a final decision, he intended to remove these cases from the scope of factional representation, and return them to the logic of party representation and list arrangement. Going beyond this meaning empties the text of its content, and turns the limitation into a mere structural description, which is not legally valid.

The third mistake in some readings is to treat the exception as an origin, and with the rule as a margin. The third paragraph, which relates to filling seats for women and youth in cases of general vacancy, cannot be dropped on the fourth paragraph, which dealt with a special and specific reason for the vacancy. The exception cannot be expanded upon, nor measured against, nor invoked outside of its context, otherwise it turns into a new rule without legislative will.

The essence of Article (58) is not based on preferring one group over another, but rather on a careful balance between the type of vacancy and its result. The natural vacancy takes into account the type and category of the seat, while the vacancy resulting from a party decision or organizational withdrawal takes into account the stability of party representation and respect for the order of the list as voted on by the voters. This distinction is not political, but purely legislative.

What is more dangerous than all of the above is that some interpretations attempt to impose ends on the text that it did not say, in the name of “the spirit of the law.” But the spirit of the law is not extracted from wishes, but from the structure of the text, its context, and its specific purposes. Deviating from the clear text under the pretext of protecting a certain group, without legislative support, turns interpretation from a tool of understanding into a means of justification.

Respecting the legislative text does not mean stagnation, but it means systematic discipline. Any reading that does not distinguish between the rule and the exception, does not respect the meaning of limitation, and does not adhere to the legislative hierarchy is a reading that produces a result, but does not produce a law.

In constitutional and electoral issues in particular, the interpretation is not measured by the extent of its popularity, but rather by the extent of its consistency with the logic of the legislation. Because parliamentary stability is not protected by good intentions, but rather by clear texts when they are read as they were written, not as they are intended to be understood.