In a familiar scene whose details are repeated periodically, the Jordanian government announced its success in issuing international bonds (Eurobonds) worth $700 million, pleased with the turnout that exceeded three times the size of the issue.

The official letter presents it as a success story proving “investor confidence” and “the strength of the economy”, as the interest rate was reduced to 5.75% compared to 7.5% in last year’s edition, with the participation of major investment funds from the United States, Europe and Asia.

But diving beneath the surface of these numbers reveals a more complex story, which carries within it structural problems that affect the entire Jordanian economic model.

Behind the lights of “success” and the praise of international trust, lie economic realities that raise concern. The stated goal of the issuance is merely to “repay the Eurobonds” that were issued ten years ago, which means that the government does not pay off its debts from its revenues or from a budget surplus, but rather borrows new debt to pay off old debt.

The “debt turnover” process represents a postponement of the crisis and not a solution to it. Despite welcoming the lower interest rate, the 5.75% for government bonds with a maturity of 7 years remains high in the global context, and reflects that global investors still view Jordan as a country that carries medium to high risks.

The real cost of these bonds appears in the depletion of the general budget, as the Jordanian government will allocate about $40 million annually to service this debt only by paying interest. This huge amount of money that comes from taxpayers will flow directly into the pockets of international investors, instead of being spent on health, education, infrastructure, or supporting the poor.

This process also reveals an economic model based on a “rentier economy,” where the country relies on loans and grants instead of building a real production base. Instead of stimulating the local economy to be a source of financing, we resort to global markets, which increases Jordan’s dependency and volatility with the fluctuations of these markets.

There is a clear gap between the exaggeratedly optimistic media discourse and the economic reality. Talking about “the strength of the economy” while we rely on borrowing to repay the borrowing is like praising the strength of a ship while using a bucket to empty the water that is seeping into it.

The aforementioned economic growth (2.7% and 2.8%) remains weak growth, not sufficient to create decent job opportunities or improve citizens’ income, and is not proportionate to the size of the rising debt.

Issuing the Eurobond is not a success in itself, but rather a necessity imposed by a liquidity and structural crisis. True confidence is not demonstrated by a country’s ability to borrow, but rather by its ability to enhance local production and transform the economy from a consumer and rentier economy to a productive economy based on manufacturing, export and innovation.

True success will come on the day when we are no longer forced to announce the issuance of Eurobonds because we have become self-reliant. Until then, “trust” remains a commodity that we buy from international markets at exorbitant prices, which we pay from our pockets and the pockets of our children, while we bet on the ability of future generations to bear the consequences of the debts we create today as we celebrate what we call “success.”