Lisa Curtis, director of the Endo-Pacific Security Program at the Center for a New American Security and a former official in the US National Security Council, called on Washington to avoid the diplomatic mistakes that foiled the withdrawal from Afghanistan.

She said in an article published by the magazine “Foreign Affairs” that the United States has ended its presence in Afghanistan and has now begun to search for the causes of American military failure over a period of 20 years. However, the disastrous end of the war was not on the battlefield but as a result of a catalog of mistakes, and Washington should seriously reconsider its diplomatic efforts, especially the peace agreement with the Taliban led by the American negotiator Zalmay Khalilzad.

She added that the negotiations that took place on the terms of the Taliban, which were not necessary or desirable, and the agreement signed in Doha accelerated the victory of the movement.

Noting that “if Biden wanted to judge his withdrawal from Afghanistan, as an acceptable diplomatic decision, his administration must deal with diplomatic failure and take difficult and realistic steps toward the Taliban.” Taking these steps is the only way to prevent the return of a haven for global terrorism. Unfortunately, the Trump administration’s rush to sign an agreement with the Taliban will complicate the process.”

After three years of negotiations, it led to the strengthening of the hardliners in the Taliban, as a large number of them played an important role in the new government, such as Sirajuddin Haqqani, whose movement was linked to al-Qaeda.

After shaping a post-withdrawal strategy, US officials should change their diplomatic tactics—that is, judge the Taliban by their actions before they and their leaders are granted international recognition. Such an approach, attached to the counterterrorism strategy, is the only way to protect American interests in the coming years.

Although the United States engaged in negotiations with the Taliban for several years, its approach was based on wishful thinking. As revealed by the “Afghanistan Papers” published by the Washington Post in 2019, the military leaders often drew a rosy assessment of the military situation or told the political leaders that they left no stone unturned in the war against the Taliban, although the reality says the opposite.

The writer stated that during her work as assistant and chair of the National Security Council for South and Central Asian Affairs from 2017-2021, she watched civilian officials ignore or hide facts that did not fit their diplomatic agenda. This led to a number of serious negotiating mistakes that produced the Doha Agreement, which paved the way for the United States to exit in exchange for the Taliban’s pledge to fight terrorism and refrain from targeting American forces on their way out.

The first mistake made by the US was the misguided belief that the Taliban would later negotiate with the US-backed government in Kabul – which Washington had excluded from the Doha talks, thus legitimizing the Taliban.

The second mistake is the failure to link the conditions of peace to the levels of violence perpetrated by the Taliban. Washington’s unwillingness to suspend negotiations, even amid escalating violence, was revealing of the desperate state of the United States and its attempt to get a deal. All the United States got was a requirement for a six-day reduction in violence before the agreement was signed.

The third mistake, which expressed American security, is that the Taliban are interested in political negotiations and do not want to gain power through military force, and force Ashraf Ghani’s government to release 5,000 prisoners without any concessions from the Taliban such as reducing violence. Among those released was an Afghan army sergeant, Qari Hikmatullah, who in 2012 killed three Australian soldiers in cold blood while they were resting at their base. Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison has appealed to Trump not to pressure Ghani to release Hikmatullah. It was unnecessary to release this killer, especially with the opposition of a trusted ally.

For its part, the Trump administration hoped that Hikmatullah’s release would facilitate peace talks, a belief that has been proven wrong. Instead, the Taliban used the Doha talks to bolster their international legitimacy and divide the Afghan leadership. All US concessions weakened Ghani’s government, sowed division within the anti-Taliban leadership, and demonstrated to Afghan security forces that the US was replacing horses, weakening their will to fight.

The states would have been better off if they negotiated directly with the Afghan government, something Ghani suggested in 2019. Had they done so, America would have avoided the demoralization of its Afghan partners. But Washington ended up signing a treaty with the government’s enemy, which it fought for 20 years and withdrew in succession, meaning that it handed over the country to the Taliban. The United States failed to assess the Taliban’s relations with terrorist movements, although Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and Khalilzad claimed that the Taliban severed ties with Al-Qaeda, the evidence indicates otherwise. In October 2020, Edmund Fitton-Brown, coordinator of the monitoring team for ISIS, al-Qaeda and the Taliban at the United Nations, said that the Taliban had promised al-Qaeda before signing the Doha agreement that it would maintain the alliance with it. He said that al-Qaeda celebrates the departure of US and NATO forces as a victory for global radicalism.

In a report issued in July 2021, the United Nations said that the relationship between the Taliban and al-Qaeda is strong and that the Taliban did little to cut it and even “strengthen its relations with the second generation,” despite the explicit language in the peace agreement that the Taliban would ask its elements not to communicate with Al-Qaeda.

It is too early to talk about the impact of the Taliban’s victory on the trends of terrorism in the region, but the first indications are worrying and evident from the appointments in the new Taliban government, especially Sirajuddin Haqqani, the Minister of the Interior, for whom the United States has allocated $5 million to anyone who captures or kills him. The only exception to this hard-line group is Abdul Ghani Baradar, the deputy prime minister who spent years in prison in Pakistan before Khalilzad requested his release to participate in peace talks. Baradar is part of the Taliban’s moderates and held talks with former President Hamid Karzai in 2009. But his demotion to a deputy is a manifestation of the militants’ strength.

As the United States examines its own diplomatic failure, it must learn from mistakes and act on lessons learned. This requires developing cooperative diplomacy with the European Union and Britain to pressure the Taliban to meet human rights and counter-terrorism demands. This differs from Khalilzad’s approach, which focused on coordination and cooperation with countries such as Russia and China, which do not attach importance to the value of human rights.

Despite the need for the United States to cooperate with the Taliban to remove the remaining American citizens and Afghan allies inside Afghanistan and to deliver humanitarian aid, there is no hurry for diplomatic recognition of the new regime in Kabul. By cooperating with allies and partners, Washington will have the ability to set up opportunity conditions to shape Taliban behavior in the future. It is able to build this balance because 70% of the budget of the Government of Afghanistan depends on external support. Donor countries must meet the needs of Afghan citizens without diplomatic recognition of the Taliban.

At the center of cooperation and communication with the Taliban is the emphasis on their respect for human rights. Its spokesman, Zabihullah Mujahid, tried to ensure that the movement changed and that it adhered to basic rights and women’s rights according to Islamic law. Contrary to Mujahid’s statements, the movement prevented girls from studying in high school and for women to go out to work.

Donor countries should assure the Taliban that new restrictions on women in education, public participation, and the economy will affect the Taliban’s ability to access international funding. Nevertheless, Washington must maintain the sanctions imposed by the Treasury and not comply with the demands of the movement, which believes that it has a right to the frozen funds of the previous government simply because it assumed power.

Washington should work with other UN Security Council members such as Britain, France and Germany to counter pressure from Russia and China to lift sanctions. In particular, the United States and its European allies should make clear that the exemption that allowed the travel of Taliban leaders will not be renewed after its expiration this year, as long as a government that represents the Afghans is not formed. A former US official said the Taliban abused the waiver in order to gain international legitimacy while continuing to fight the government and kill officials, journalists and others.

In another direction, the United States should reassess its handling of Pakistan, on which it has relied so much to facilitate peace talks. But the statements of Pakistani officials after the victory of the Taliban were very interesting. Prime Minister Imran Khan described the movement’s victory as freedom from the shackles of slavery. And the United States worked successfully to persuade Islamabad to stop Taliban activities inside its territory, and Trump stopped military aid in 2018, although Islamabad continued its support and allowed the Taliban movement of Afghanistan to move and transfer supplies through its territory.

Punishing Pakistan now would be too late, but Washington should learn the lessons of failed counter-terrorism cooperation. And Washington can cooperate with Pakistan to strike ISIS targets – Khorasan Province. But the Pakistani intelligence will never strike the Haqqani network, which is linked to al-Qaeda. The Pakistani intelligence and military rely on this network to prevent India from building a foothold in Afghanistan. Instead, the Biden administration should refocus its attention to cooperating with other regional powers such as India.

For a long time, Washington avoided cooperating with New Delhi in the fight against terrorism so as not to anger Pakistan. After the failure of this strategy, Washington must cooperate with democratic countries that fight terrorism instead of relying on countries that use terrorist groups to achieve their goals. Despite Biden’s emphasis on defeating al-Qaeda, the new era in Afghanistan prevents terrorist groups from an exceptional and dangerous opportunity.

Afghanistan is now ruled by a movement that fought for 30 years with al-Qaeda and over time jihadist groups will try to take advantage of the opportunity and rebuild their sanctuaries in the country. The United States cannot wash its hands of Afghanistan in the hope that the terrorist threat will disappear. It ignored the country after the departure of the Soviet Union, which led to the 9/11 attacks. America’s post-withdrawal behavior must be based on a combination of commitment to human dignity, defense of human rights, and awareness of the terrorist threat. The only way for the United States to regain its credibility is to cooperate with allies to shape the behavior of the Taliban. Above all, studying the mistakes of negotiations with the Taliban and dealing with them from a position of force.