Compass – The presence of the Indian Foreign Minister, Subramaniam Jaishankar, in the inauguration ceremony of Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi in Tehran – although it was a matter of protocol – raised many questions due to the current situation in the region after the withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan; New Delhi’s long-term calculations about the regional balance of power are pushing it toward closer strategic cooperation with Tehran.

Iran appears eager to reciprocate; When Jaishankar was in Tehran last month on his way to Moscow, Raisi personally greeted him before assuming the official presidency; This made Jaishankar the first foreign minister to have the opportunity to meet with the new Iranian president, which clearly showed Iran’s interest in intensifying cooperation with India. And in recent weeks, New Delhi and Tehran have intensified consultations on the rapidly evolving situation in Afghanistan, according to a report by The Foreign Policy magazine.

What does the Taliban’s return to power mean?

The rapprochement between India and Iran in this context is compounded by their common concerns about the Taliban movement and its possible return to power in Kabul, and they are also united by a common determination to prevent Pakistan’s domination of Afghanistan; Which would not only profoundly change the geopolitics of South and Central Asia, but also have huge repercussions in West Asia as well.

On the other hand, views differ between New Delhi and Tehran about the role of the United States in the region. India’s strategic partnership with the United States has deepened in recent decades, while at the same time rising tensions and confrontation lines between Washington and Tehran.

The paths of the two countries diverged on another level. At a time when India’s relations with the UAE and Saudi Arabia intensified in recent years, the conflict over Iran’s relationship with its Arab neighbors in the Gulf dominated and intensified during the same years. Moreover, India is closer than ever to Israel, even as the hostility between Tel Aviv and Tehran has raged at times.

India’s policy in its alliances

India has transcended some convictions that some proponents of India’s new alignments might now consider reductive certainties dating back to the post-independence phase. India no longer appeals to binary in its foreign policy in the Middle East, such as Western imperialism versus the developing world, Israeli Zionism versus Arab nationalism, and Islamism versus governance. secular.

Another factor that India has invoked in shaping its new policy towards the Middle East is its need to block the way for Pakistan to rally the region to support it in the name of Islam in its disputes with India.

Since the end of the Cold War, India has developed moderate relations with most countries in the Middle East. But the only exception today is Turkey. India is deeply disturbed by the new alliance between Turkey, Pakistan and Qatar to support the Taliban.

India fears that a Taliban-controlled Afghanistan will likely reinstate what it sees as Islamist militancy in the disputed region of Kashmir (which India revoked in 2019 the special status it had granted them with a form of autonomy) and the rest of the neighboring regions.

It is not surprising, then, that New Delhi has taken a strong diplomatic stance against the violent overthrow of the current political system in Kabul, even as it has opened avenues of communication with the Taliban. Hence, India believes that it needs a strong regional partner in order to be able to strengthen its political position on the ground and have influence over any repercussions that the situation in Afghanistan may lead to. And in New Delhi’s calculations, Tehran is that partner.

What does Afghanistan represent for India?

It does not appear that the return of the Taliban to power will restore the old Indo-Iranian-Russian alliance in the face of the movement; Moscow accepts the Taliban this time, albeit with some skepticism, and on the other hand is focusing on working closely with Islamabad. China, which enjoys good relations with Pakistan and Russia and deteriorating relations with India, also appears to be open to some kind of early normalization with the Taliban.

All of these hostile alliances make Iran India’s most important potential partner in Afghanistan, not least because of the geographical access that allows India to deliver civilian and military aid to the Afghan government facing the Taliban. These efforts are not new: since the fall of the Taliban with the US invasion in 2001, successive Indian governments have invested in establishing alternative access routes to Afghanistan via Iran.

For these reasons, the government of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has paid special attention to the transportation infrastructure linking Iran with Afghanistan. In this context, India is contributing to the construction of Chabahar port located on the southeast coast of Iran, and is now promoting Chabahar port as a reliable option to link Central Asia and Afghanistan to the Arabian Sea region via Iran, and is offering it as an alternative to the existing economic corridor between China and Pakistan.

Where is the relationship between India and Iran?

Despite that, the Any cooperation between India and Iran remains constrained by several factors: the firstAlthough both countries share a variety of concerns about the ideological orientation of the Taliban, Iran shares the movement’s strong anti-American sentiments. Tehran has also maintained close contacts with the Taliban, not only as a hedge in the event of the movement’s return to power, but also as a useful tool for working to drive US forces out of its Afghan neighborhood. As for India, its relations with the Taliban movement are much less flexible than those of Iran with the movement, for several reasons, the most important of which is the clear bias of the movement to Pakistan in its long-standing conflict with India.

Second, Iran’s potential support for the Kabul government against the Taliban may be a double-edged sword in Kabul’s hands. Over the past few years, Iran has created the “Fatemiyoun” Brigade, made up of Afghan Shiite fighters and deployed it in Syria, and earlier this year, the Iranian foreign minister offered The brigade’s services depend on the Afghan government, but Kabul has expressed concern that the use of this type of militia could further inflame sectarian sentiments in the country. In contrast, New Delhi has a natural conservative approach to these matters, preferring traditional forms of support to the Kabul government or the creation of a broad coalition to counter the Taliban rather than the use of sectarian militias.

In conclusion, India has never overlooked the fact that Iran, which shares borders with Afghanistan and Pakistan, has always been a decisive actor in the geopolitics of the region. India’s recent high-level contacts with Iran have boosted New Delhi’s hopes that Raisi’s close ties to Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, will bring greater coherence to Iran’s regional policies. India also hopes that Raisi’s Iran will be able to calm tensions with the United States and ease conflicts with its Arab neighbors in the Gulf. Skeptics will marvel at these hopes as over-ambitious, but with the situation in Afghanistan deteriorating, New Delhi has no choice but to build on the few options it has with Iran and work to manage any collateral consequences that might arise.

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